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INTERNAL CONTROL AND 
AUDITING IN S M A L L BANKS 
The following remarks are devoted to a review of the purpose of audits, what 
they are trying to accomplish, how they relate to internal control and what a 
small bank might do to establish or improve an audit program. 
PURPOSE 
The purpose of auditing in banks, large and small, is to insure accurate 
presentation of financial statements, including the balance sheet and the 
results of operations. Accurate financial statements are important in 
safeguarding the stability of a bank, protecting the depositors and informing 
owners and management of operating results. The various regulators are also 
interested in protecting the depositor and insuring overall public confidence 
in the banking and monetary system. These regulators include the Federal 
Reserve System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation and the various state supervisors. Accordingly, banks 
are constantly involved with broad-brush audits which are performed 
primarily to determine overall financial stability. In addition to the audits 
done by the regulators, other audit work should be done. This can be 
accomplished using internal audit staffs, outside CPAs or some combination 
of the two. 
INTERNAL CONTROL 
The most important way to provide adequate protection for a bank is not 
by the use of auditing but through the establishment and maintenance of 
appropriate accounting controls. Many think of internal controls as those 
expensive, often impractical suggestions made by an auditor or examiner as a 
result of completing a "yes/no" checklist or questionnaire and that are 
received less than enthusiastically by management. However, bank manage-
ment has really been involved in internal control for years in many ways. 
Since the bank's product in the marketplace is money, the commodity 
most susceptible to fraudulent manipulation, the banking industry has long 
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been concerned with controls. While most of these relate to controlling cash, 
others are also necessary relating to accounting records. Controls must be 
realistic and practical. This point is emphasized in the language that the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants recommends be used in 
reports on auditors' evaluations of internal accounting controls: 
The objective of internal accounting control is to provide reasonable, but not 
absolute, assurance as to the safeguarding of assets against loss from unauthorized use 
or disposition, and the reliability of financial records for preparing financial 
statements and maintaining accountability for assets. The concept of reasonable 
assurance recognizes that the cost of a system of internal accounting control should 
not exceed the benefits derived and also recognizes that the evaluation of these 
factors necessarily requires estimates and judgments by management. 
There are inherent limitations that should be recognized in considering the 
potential effectiveness of any system of internal accounting control. In the 
performance of most control procedures, errors can result from misunderstanding of 
instructions, mistakes of judgment, carelessness, or other personal factors. Control 
procedures whose effectiveness depends upon segregation of duties can be circum-
vented by collusion. Similarly, control procedures can be circumvented intentionally 
by management with respect either to the execution and recording of transactions or 
with respect to the estimates and judgments required in the preparation of financial 
statements. Further, projection of any evaluation of internal accounting control to 
future periods is subject to the risk that the procedures may become inadequate 
because of changes in conditions, and that the degree of compliance with the 
procedures may deteriorate.1 
To obtain a clearer picture of internal controls, how they work and what 
they do, let us explore the classes of errors and how they come about, and 
some of the available controls. 
• Kinds of Error. There are two classes of errors: intentional, fraudulent acts 
with the intent to steal funds or improve financial results and unintentional 
errors resulting from mistakes or oversights. 
A common misconception is that audits are performed only to discover 
defalcations—fraudulent acts. This is one purpose but far from the most 
important. An audit program that is designed to catch errors in tellers' cash 
funds or correspondent bank accounts, while overlooking the fact that the 
worthless status of a significant portion of the loan portfolio (regardless of 
whether intentionally hidden) threatens the very solvency of the bank, is a 
poorly conceived and directed audit program. 
1. Committee on Auditing Procedure, "Reports on Internal Control," Statement on 
Auditing Procedure No. 49 (New York: American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 1971), pp. 178-79. 
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Unintentional errors include such things as improper recognition of 
monthly unearned interest income on instalment loans, improper compu-
tation of interest income on early loan payoffs, incorrect savings account or 
CD interest expense computations or various mispostings to income and 
expense accounts—innocent mistakes that could result in loss to the bank or 
inaccurate financial statement presentation. This is the kind of error most 
often overlooked in designing control systems, but it is certainly a 
responsibility of management. 
More familiar are the intentional errors, especially those resulting from 
defalcations or fraud—such things as teller cash shortages; missing securities; 
unauthorized disbursements; unauthorized or fictitious loans to employees, 
officers or related parties; improper savings account withdrawals and the like. 
Most people in the banking business have come into contact with one or more 
of these situations. 
The intentional errors just listed are known as temporary concealments. In 
every fraud there must be opportunity—i.e., access to cash, securities, 
etc.—and in addition the ability to conceal. The teller who takes cash from 
her fund has perpetrated a fraud but has no way to conceal it permanently. A 
future count of her fund will expose the shortage. This is also true if she takes 
cash and prepares a ticket to record a withdrawal from an uncontrolled 
inactive savings account. A little more imagination has been shown, but the 
concealment is still temporary and can be exposed when the saver comes in to 
withdraw funds or the account is confirmed. A fictitious loan made by an 
employee or officer is also concealed only temporarily. Not only is there a 
loan to a fictitious customer, but the interest and principal payments must be 
kept current to avoid detection, and this often leads to additional false loans 
to continue the concealment. 
Unfortunately, there are also methods of concealment that can be 
considered permanent. An unauthorized check may be written for personal 
use and charged to an expense account where it will go unnoticed. A more 
complex example is the underrecording of the interest income due the bank 
on an early loan payoff by reducing the amount of the cash receipt ticket and 
pocketing the additional amount received. There is nothing left to be 
discovered if the undercharging of interest is not detected, because the 
income of the bank is understated and this is not likely to be noticed. 
• Segregation of Duties. It can be seen that in designing a system of internal 
control an attempt should be made to segregate the duties of employees in 
such a way that a person with access to assets does not have the related 
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recording responsibilities. For example, an employee who prepares disburse-
ment checks should not prepare the cash disbursements records or reconcile 
the outstanding checks with the account balance. An employee who can 
make a loan should not have the authority to write off bad accounts without 
independent review and approval, so that he cannot subsequently write off 
bad loans made to himself. 
These segregations of duties are easy to arrange in large banks with enough 
employees so that jobs can be divided according to a systematic plan of 
control. Too many small banks use their size as an excuse for lack of a system 
of internal control. This is really not a good excuse. It is management's 
responsibility to provide an effective system of accounting control regardless 
of size. 
By exercising some imagination there are many things that can be done to 
divide responsibilities within the small bank. Tellers and other employees can 
be used periodically to perform certain unrelated tasks to provide control. 
Tellers can be used on a rotating basis to reconcile correspondent bank 
accounts. Cash funds can be rotated among tellers periodically. Detailed 
ledgers can be run and agreed to controls by different employees each time 
on a random rotation selected by an officer. Custody records for securities 
can be maintained by an employee without any other related securities 
functions. A little thought will suggest any number of effective ways to 
segregate specific duties. 
ROLE OF AUDITING 
Since the primary defense against errors (intentional and unintentional) is 
internal control, auditing should be used to insure that controls do exist and 
that they are effective. This is done by testing—independent work performed 
to determine whether the internal system of control is functioning. Where 
adequate controls over particular functions do not exist, proper auditing 
technique requires that enough additional testing work be done to reveal any 
errors that may have occurred. 
In carrying out independent confirmation and verification of securities, 
bank accounts, certificates of deposit, loans, checking accounts, etc., auditors 
are testing the accuracy of accounts to determine whether controls are 
effective, and in some cases they are performing these tests on an expanded 
basis because no controls exist over certain of these operations. When 
returned checks are compared with supporting documents for proper 
authorization and proper recording, compliance with existing control 
procedures is again being tested. 
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The functions of internal audit can be performed in smaller banks by 
establishing a program for examination of transactions on a test basis at 
different times during the year. Depending upon the size of the bank, the 
testing can be performed by an officer with the assistance of selected 
employees on a part-time basis, by outside auditors or by full-time auditors. 
The important thing is that controls must be established and periodically 
examined for effectiveness, and items not under control must be thoroughly 
tested. These steps are taken to detect errors, whether intentional or 
unintentional, so that financial statements are correctly presented and to 
insure the financial stability of the bank by safeguarding its assets. 
Every bank, regardless of size, should have at the least a basic audit 
program. This can be accomplished by laying out the steps to be taken and 
their frequency. One such step could be the independent reconciliation of 
bank accounts by an employee other than the one regularly assigned. One 
correspondent account might be selected at random each month for 
reconciliation by this other employee. A chart could be set up, showing this 
step as item 1 and indicating what bank account was reconciled in the month 
of January and by whom. This would give the part-time auditor assurance 
that the accounts are being rotated and provide a record of what was 
accomplished. 
The next line could show another step, perhaps a cash fund rotation 
schedule to be used for controlling the periodic exchange of funds among 
tellers. Another might show who ran the various ledger cards for loans, 
savings and the like each month (assuming that the system is not automated) 
so as to insure that each is run by a different teller each time. Additional lines 
would show how often the work should be done, who did it last and when. 
This chart, maintained by the officer with the audit responsibility, has 
several uses. It is an audit program, a scheduling chart and an assignment 
record, and it takes the place of an audit report. For an outsider walking into 
a bank to evaluate its audit program, this kind of record would be the most 
descriptive and useful tool imaginable for providing a true picture of what the 
program consists of. A program of this sort is possible and desirable for any 
bank, regardless of size. It can be done with a minimum of effort and 
expanded over a period of time, and will be very valuable in improving overall 
audit effectiveness. 
COMPUTERIZED RECORDS 
Banks that have computerized records prepared by a service bureau or 
another bank should not become too comfortable about having avoided many 
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of the internal control problems discussed above. While the information 
arrives in neatly prepared form, the data contained in these printouts are still 
susceptible to teller manipulation and also may be open to unauthorized 
manipulation by someone at the data center. The danger of an unauthorized 
withdrawal by a teller is not lessened by a computer-maintained record, and it 
might be possible for a service-center employee to open a legitimate account 
at the bank and then transfer funds from other accounts to his own. 
This is not an inherent problem for data-processing users. A data center 
can also have segregated duties and an organizational plan of internal control. 
However, there are probably many that do not, and a bank should find out 
immediately whether the controls at a service bureau that it uses or 
contemplates using are adequate. This is as much a part of the bank's internal 
control as any other. 
To obtain satisfaction that the necessary controls are in effect, the bank 
may have to call in an expert with experience in independent evaluation of 
EDP installation controls. A l l large CPA firms can and do perform these 
evaluations. First, however, the bank should inquire of the servicer whether 
such an evaluation has already been made by a qualified independent party. If 
it has, a copy of the letter report on the facility may be available. This report 
may provide the necessary satisfaction that controls are adequate, or it may 
tell the bank where to look to make sure that any material weaknesses have 
been corrected. Such an evaluation is not an absolute guarantee that no 
problems exist, but, like many other approaches to internal control, it is a 
reasonable method of insuring that at least adequate protection is afforded 
through effective controls. 
SUMMARY 
The foregoing has perhaps dealt more with internal control than with 
actual auditing, but the two are so closely related that they cannot 
realistically be separated. Only through careful evaluation of controls and an 
integrated auditing function, to make sure that the controls continue to exist, 
can the financial stability of a bank be properly safeguarded and the financial 
position and results of operations be accurately presented. 
Auditing need not and should not be an uninteresting subject, because the 
continuing understanding and evaluation of controls is not only a responsi-
bility of management but can also be a source of great pride of 
accomplishment if one has helped to strengthen the bank's controls and 
prevent that potential defalcation that is of the utmost professional 
embarrassment to any bank's management. • 
